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Summarv 
Within the framework of expected utility maximisation a high degree of 
risk aversion may lead farmers to put more effort to the production of 
the risky erop. If risk is 'manageable', i.e. if they can adjust inputs 
to the weather conditions then the resulting set of optima reflects the 
risk attitude of the farmer and uncertainty in one argument of the 
utility function can be diminished by increasing uncertainty in 
another. This provides a more general framework for risk analysis 
including safety-first models. 
1. Introduction 
In the past ten years, a great number of articles have been published 
that deal with the importance of risk in farmers' decisions. Most of 
the empirical work has focussed on the extent to which behaviour 
towards risk influences the erop mix, treating land allocation similar 
to a portfolio problem, in which the objective is to maximise a 
function with both expected returns and its variance as arguments. Such 
studies employ linear, quadratic or MOTAD programming (see Hazell's 
survey,1982) or use an econometrie profit or utility maximising 
approach (cf. Pope's survey,1982). Another strand of research has 
focussed on the elicitation of farmers' preferences regarding expected 
income vs. income variance by experiments, in which farmers were 
offered a choice between lotteries (Binswanger,1980) or were 
interviewed about their expectations and 'degree of surprise' at 
various outcomes and the equivalent certain income (e.g. Scandizzo & 
Dillon.1979 or Hamal & Anderson,1982). 
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Many authors, particularly those dealing with risks facing farmers in 
poor regions, have stressed the importance of subsistence risk. A 
widely held belief is that first and foremost farmer's behaviour toward 
risk is that the amount of food (or occasionally money) required for 
the subsistence of the family needs to be assured. Only then will he 
consider other activities, such as cash crops, other technologies etc. 
in which he often shows no marked risk aversion (Kunreuther & 
Wright,1979 and Shahabuddin & Mestelman,1986 for jute in Bangladesh; 
Ortiz,1979). Risk, in these studies, however, is considered more or 
less homogeneous and no explicit distinction is made within a utility 
frame work between food, grown and consumed on the farm, and cash 
crops, sold for money, used to purchase urban goods and services. 
As far as utility functions are employed, they mostly have but one 
argument (income) or two related arguments (expected income and income 
variance, e.g. Wolgin,1975). When markets for family labour or for the 
food erop are not well developed, as is the case in many LDCs, no 
perfect substitution between money income and food and 'leisure' can be 
assumed. 
This paper considers a family farm in such an environment. The basic 
model distinguishes food and 'leisure' as arguments in the utility 
function, where food can be produced by employing family labour (the 
complement of leisure). 
Mutatis mutandis. this model also represents the trade off between home 
produced food and a cash erop, if instead of leisure, production of a 
composite good, consisting of leisure and food is taken, and instead of 
food, consumption of an urban good, c.q. production of a cash erop is 
considered. In this case, the arguments of the utility function would 
be the consumption of 'home goods' and of a good, purchased with the 
proceeds of cash erop sales. Putting consumption of the 'home good' 
equal to its production would lead to a similar type of analysis. 
The next section introduces and applies Arrow's (1965) and Pratt's 
(1964) concept of risk aversion and risk premium. Section 3 extends the 
application to the more realistic case where, to a certain extent, risk 
is 'manageable' and adjustments can be made after the uncertainty is 
resolved. Some concluding comments are given in section 4. 
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2. Risk and expected utility 
Risk analysis starts with how uncertainty about arguments of the 
utility function is evaluated. Only then can the implications be 
derived for the allocation of resources, such as family labour. The 
common approach to risk behaviour is the Arrow-Pratt measure of 
absolute risk aversion. 
Consider a utility function u(x) where x is uncertain, with expected 
value E[x] - /i and variance o2 . 
What amount, to be called the risk premium , would the individual be 
prepared to pay to have a certain n instead of the uncertain x? 
Or, for what value of the premium n would 
u(fi-it) = u(x)? 
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the left-hand-side (LHS) and a 
second-order expansion of the RHS, both around /x: 
u(/i) - w u' (fi) - u(/i) + e u' (ju) + h e2 u" (/O , 
where e is the (stochastic) difference between x and /J. 
Taking expectations of the RHS, with E e = 0 and E e2 •-» o2 , we have 
-n u'(n) = 4 o2 U"(M) 
or 
•K - -h o2 u"(/i)/u'(/i). 
For normal (concave) utility functions, this expression is positive and 
a certain amount lower than \i will have a utility equal to that of the 
uncertain amount with expected value of /*. The ratio u"/u' can be seen 
to be proportional to the risk premium (n) per unit of variance. 
The coëfficiënt of absolute risk aversion A is defined as 
A(x) - - u"(x)/u'(x) 
For u(x) — xa, A equals (l-a)/x; for u(x) - -e"ax, A - a. 
Another derivation of a risk premium would answer the question: What 
relative premium nr would an agent pay to have 
u(/i(l-*r)) = u(x)? 
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Again taking first and second order Taylor approximations, but now 
assuming that x = /i(l+e), and taking expectations, we find 
7rr - -h a2n u"(/*)/u'(p). 
This yields the coëfficiënt of relative risk aversion, 
R(x) = - x u"(x)/u'(x), 
so that 
R(x) = x A(x). 
R(x) is proportional to the relative risk premium per unit of variance 
of e, where e - (x-/i)//i. Note, however, that the assumptions on e in 
this derivation differ from those in deriving the expression for A(x). 
For u(x) - xa, R(x) - 1-a; for u(x) - x1"a/(l-a), R(x) - a. 
R(x) can also be considered as the elasticity of marginal utility (see 
Newbery & Stiglitz,1981,p.72) and it is, therefore, dimensionless. 
Other interpretations of R(x) are given by Hanoch(1977). 
To give an example, suppose x has a coëfficiënt of variation of 0.25, 
i.e. e has a Standard deviation of 0.25, and the utility function is 
characterised by constant relative risk aversion of 2, then the agent 
woultl be willing to sacrifice 6.25 % in order to eliminate uncertainty. 
If in our derivation, we would have taken the second-order 
approximation of both sides of the equality-sign, we would have found 
R.*-r - -1 + (l+a2R2)h 
and 
A.JT = -1 + (1+CT2A2)H 
and in our example the agent would be willing to sacrifice only 5.9 %. 
The difference between the two orders of approximation becomes 
particularly clear for R -»• « (or A -* «) when the first-order premiums 
would tend to infinity, whereas the second-order premiums would tend to 
o. As the premiums are increasing functions of the aversion 
coefficients, o forms an upperbound for them. 
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Important applications of expected utility maximisation can be found in 
agriculture. They pertain to land use planning under uncertainty about 
yields and/or prices, to adoption of innovations and to the use of 
risk-changing inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides. In these 
application the farmer is assumed to maximise the expected value of the 
utility, derived from income earned by allocating resources to 
activities, yielding uncertain returns. 
The basic model for a family farm, deciding on how much effort to 
invest in a risky erop would be as follows. 
max E [u(f, t-i)] 
s.t. f - f(i,e), 
where ü stands for hours of work, yielding an uncertain production of 
f, e.g. food, that enters the utility function jointly with leisure, 
represented by t-i, t being total time available. 
First-order condition for a maximum is that 
Etu^! - u2] = 0 
and the second-order condition is that 
E[ Ull fl + Ul fll " fl( U12 + U2l) + U22] < °» 
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives to the first and/or 
second arguments. For u to describe a normal consumer's utility 
function, we require u to be strictly concave with positive first-order 
derivatives, or 
Uj, u 2 > 0 > u l x , u 2 2 
and 
u u u12 > 0 
U2 1 U2 2 
Now assume the impact of € on f to be as f — g(i)(l+re), where r is a 
measure for the degree of uncertainty (r>0), and E e = 0, E e2 » o2 . 
The first-order condition is 
E ug - E[ulgi(l+re) - u2] = 0, 
which can be written as 
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E u0  
S i
 " EtUid+re)] " 
How would Z react to an increase of r, i.e. to a 'mean-preserving' 
spread of the return to labour? 
Since _- = -E(75—1)/E(w^) , where u_g is the derivative of u with respect 
to Z after substituting the function f() for the first argument in the 
utility function, the sign of the relationship between Z and r is the 
same as that of E[3u_g/3r], by virtue of the second-order condition. 
Now 
j ^ - " Si(uie + u^geCl+re)) - u21ge 
which is positive when the covariance of gjjCut + uxlg(l+r€)) - u12g and 
e is positive. At the margin this is so when the first derivative of 
the former expression with respect to e is positive, i.e. when 
gi(2u11gr + ulxlg2r(l+re)) - u211g2r > 0 
Sufficiënt conditions for this inequality to hold are that 
"au < 0 
3Rf/3f < 0 
Rf > 1, 
where Rf is the coëfficiënt of relative risk aversion of food 
consumption, Rf =• -(l+re)gu11/u1. This can be seen by considering, that 
if Rf is decreasing in (l+re)g, then_3Rf/3e must be negative. Hence, 
-g{(l+re)[u111gru1-u11u11gr]/u| + ru^/u^} < 0 
which implies that 
g(H-re)uxll + ulx(l+Rf) > 0. 
For Rf > 1, this implies that g(l+re)uxll + 2ulx > 0, because ulx<0. 
If the utility function is of the CES type, then u211 < 0, when the 
substitution elasticity is less than unity (Rothschild 6e Stiglitz, 
1971). 
Thus we f ind that under certain circumstances, when the farmer is 
sufficiently food-risk averse, has a relative food-risk aversion 
coëfficiënt that is decreasing in f, and for whom Z and f are not 
6 
easily substitutable, more food will be produced the more risky is its 
production. 
Conversely, a more food-risk averse producer would allocate more labour 
to food production. This can be shown by considering a second-order 
approximation of the expression for uj>, regarded as a function of e. 
We had as first-order condition that 
E u^ = 0 
With a second-order approximation around e=0, E u^ can be written 
E ui " ut* + ff2Sigr2(2un + u m S ) " u2iiê2r2 
which has a positive derivative with respect to ux r. Here, Uj> denotes 
the value of ujj for e=0. Hence, if uxl would become more negative, and 
the farmer more food-risk averse, E u^ would decrease, which would be 
compensated by an increase in I, to meet the original first-order 
condition. 
Summarising, for a farm family that operates outside the market, and is 
therefore characterised by an internal equilibrium as to the trade off 
between leisure and food production, under specific circumstances, more 
food will be produced when food production is more risky, and more food 
is produced when the family is more averse to risk in food production. 
For families that operate within the market, and that therefore equate 
expected marginal Utilities to market prices, these effects do not 
occur. Such families would tend toward less food production, and more 
wage labour, if food production would-be more risky, as follows from 
the normal portfolio approach to allocation of labour. 
3. Manageable risk and expected utility 
Above, a subscript f was attached to the coëfficiënt of relative risk 
aversion to indicate that only the aversion in the f-direction of the 
domain of the utility function was relevant. The other argument in the 
utility function, leisure, was not affected by the random term, as it 
is considered an instrument in the decision process. First a decision 
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is made on how much labour to allocate (and how much leisure to take), 
then a random production and a random utility results from the process. 
Changes in Z bring about changes in f and its variance. 
In the real world, production of a erop takes time, and the uncertainty 
about yields is not just resolved af ter the labour decision is made. 
During the growing season labour input can be adjusted to partly 
compensate for the vagaries of nature. In practice the cropping pattern 
itself can be adjusted by intercropping or resowing. 
To incorporate such effects, a distinction needs to be made between the 
initial allocation of resources, to be made before anything is known 
about e, and the allocation made later, partly in response to one of 
the sequential realisations of e. 
Suppose the initial allocation of resources refers to land and the e-
dependent realisation refers to labour. Thus, at the beginning of the 
growing season, land is allocated to food production and sown. Later in 
the season, more labour needs to be used for weeding, harvesting etc. , 
but the allocation of this labour is made subject to weather 
conditions. If weather is fine, less labour may be required per unit of 
food, than when the weather conditions are worse. 
The initial land allocation problem then needs to take two types of 
uncertainty into account. One type has to do with uncertainty about the 
resulting amount of food, the other type with the amount of labour to 
be allocated to the erop during the growing season. As the farmer knows 
how he will respond to all sorts of weather, he takes this into 
consideration in his initial land allocation. When his utility and 
production function are known, and the probability distribution of e is 
known, a probability distribution can be derived of the labour he will 
allocate during the growing season. The initial land allocation then 
maximises the expected value of a utility function which incorporates 
the e-dependent labour allocation. 
His problem should be formulated as 
max E max u(f(a,i,e),t-i(a)) , 
a i 
where a stands for acreage allocated to food crops. We now consider the 
first part of this optimisation problem. How are food consumption (and 
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production) and labour adjusted to e, when maximising u, with land 
predetermined? Or, deleting a, what is 
max u(f(^,e),t-i) 
An optimum requires 
uifi " u2 ' ° 
and 
f = f(i,e) 
for all values of e and we have 
di uxf12 + f1f2u11 - f2u21 
d7 H 
where N is equal to -u^^: 
N - -{Ujfn + Unfjfj - fi(u21+u12) + u22} > 0 
di/de now measures the change in the optimal Z per unit change in e. 
The corresponding change in f follows from 
d f
 _ f <" + f _ Ul( fl f12- fll f 2) + flf2^12 - f2 U22 
By convention f2 can be set to positive values, fx naturally is 
positive and fxi negative. 
Using the first-order conditions we have 
££ > 0 f or J ü - |l2. <- ÜL2. - ^22. dl r V T ^
 Ul u2 
and 
*£ < 0 for _!" < Ï2i - üü, de txt2 u2 ux 
thus allowing 'technical' characteristics, the derivatives of f, to be 
separated from 'behavioural' characteristics, reflected in u and its 
derivatives. 
A positive change in e increases f initially by f2de but this change 
can be reduced by adjustment of the labour input. 
Suppose that at average levels of e, df/de is positive and, therefore, 
that di/de > -f2/f1, and that such a positive 'change of nature' makes 
some reduction in effort possible, so that -f2/f! < di/de < 0. 
How would these changes respond to changes in the extent of risk 
aversion? In what variable would more risk-averse decision makers make 
the larger adjustment? As in the previous section, the impact of 
changing risk aversion is measured here by the response of di/de and 
df/de to a change in ux: and u22. We have 
3(di/de) _ fxf2 fxfx di f1(. f di fx df. 
dulx " ~W- + TT—ÏÏ7 IT^ 2 r W FT-ÏÏ?' 
3(df/de) f? df. 
3uxl r"dT' 
3(di/de) 1 di. 3(df/de) fx di. 
3u22 = N'dT' 3u22 " N~'dT' 
so that for df/de > 0 and -(f2/fx) < di/de < 0, we have 
3(di/de)/3u1]L > 0 and 3(df/de)/3ulx > 0 and 
3(di/de)/3u22 < 0 and 3(df/de)/3u22 < 0. 
Thus, a lower ux x, i.e. more aversion to food-risks will decrease the 
change in f per unit change of e and reduce the absolute size of df, 
whereas di/de will also be lower, thus increasing the absolute size of 
di. A household that is more averse to random changes in leisure will 
show the opposite, i.e, the absolute size of di will decrease and that 
of df will increase per unit change in e. 
This means that the set of optima (given the initial land allocation) 
c-rresponding to the values that e can possibly take reflects the risk 
attitude of the household. As an extreme case, consider the much 
discussed safety-first approach to food production. There it is assumed 
that households will 'always' satisfy their basic subsistence needs, 
bef ore considering other activities. When cast in the term of our 
model, this amounts to assuming (1) that these household are highly 
averse to food risks at that point (an extremely low u11) and (2) that 
obviously labour can be adjusted so as to (more or less) guarantee that 
this level is reached. From the above derivation it follows that at 
such high levels of food-risk aversion, the input of labour will bear 
most of the burden of the adjustment to unforeseen circumstances and 
that the set of optimal levels of food will be narrow. In the food-
leisure space, this set of optima would then form a straight line at 
the subsistence level of food. This will, of course, have an influence 
on the acreage allocation. If the utility function and the production 
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process are such, that by adjusting labour input, food erop yields can 
be stabilised, the acreage allocation can be made in an almost certain 
environment. 
As df/de and dü/de are measures for the ex ante uncertainty about f and 
i, the analysis shows that uncertainty in one argument of the utility 
function can be reduced by increasing the uncertainty in another 
argument. But this requires that the second-order derivatives of the 
utility function (uj
 x and u22) are regarded as parameters, reflecting 
the local household attitude towards risk. Households with ample supply 
of family labour may have values of u22 close to zero, so that 
relatively big changes in labour supply can be made in response to 
realisations of e resulting in relatively small changes in food 
produced. Thus, a sufficiënt labour capacity on the farm may contribute 
to reduced uncertainty about food production. When labour becomes 
scarce, as is the case when male workers leave the farm to work 
elsewhere, "agriculture suffers. It allows of no preparatory 
cultivation nor does it enable him to take advantage of favourable 
rainfalls" (Schapera, quoted in Low, 1986,p.52). 
Production strategies, where erop mixes are adjusted to weather 
conditions prevailing during the growing season are widely reported 
(see e.g. Huijsman, 1986 or Just & Candler, 1985). When households are 
more averse to risks in food produced than to risks in cash crops and 
labour is adjustable to weather conditions, ceteris paribus one would 
expect to see the variance in food yields to be lower (relative to its 
'natural' level) than that of cash erop yields. Yet, in most empirical 
and theoretical analyses of supply under risk, the time aspect and the 
possibilities this offers for risk reduction are mostly ignored. Just 
and Pope (1979) , in their article on the formulation of supply 
equations under risk, emphasize the inclusion of a separate mechanism 
to account for risk-changing activities. In their view supply functions 
should at least be modeled as 
y - f(x) + h(x)e, 
so that the variables x have an impact on both the 'certain' part of y 
and on its 'uncertain' part. They do not, however, derive this result 
from a formal model. 
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The uncertainty about the returns of a cash erop consists of yield risk 
and of price risks, whereas the returns of the home-consumed food erop 
are governed-by the yield only. Even if the farmer could control the 
yields of a cash erop, he would still face the price risk. Even this 
latter risk may be manageable to some extent, however. Akiyama (1985), 
for example, finds that jute yields in Bangladesh are positively 
influenced by current prices and if farmers can adjust to current 
prices, their uncertainty about the total returns should also be 
manageable to some extent. 
4. Concludine comments 
In the previous section it was shown that a high degree of aversion to 
food-risk may lead to more effort put into food production. In 
addition, when the risk is - more or less - manageable, such high 
relative risk aversion should lead to relatively certain yields. The 
derivation of the results rested on an analysis of effects of a lower 
second-order derivative in one direction. Models that are meant to 
reflect such extremely high degrees of risk aversion at some point 
should therefore not have constant second-order derivatives, as would 
be the case when using a second-order approximation of a utility 
function. Risk aversion being a 'second-order' phenomenon itself 
requires that the underlying model should at least provide a third-
order approximation to the 'real' utility function. Changing second-
order derivatives - extremely low at points close to the subsistence 
level but rapidly increasing at higher level of food or income - also 
explain the observed 'down-side risk aversion' (cf. Menezes et 
al.,1980) and 'focus loss' types of behaviour (cf. Boussard 6e Petit, 
1967). 
Risk aversion is measured in a certain direction. Risk aversion 
coefficients in the various directions of the domain of the utility 
function may show large differences. If the farm household would be 
fully integrated in the market, and hence would accommodate his input 
and output to the prevailing prices, the only risk left would be income 
risk and only the income-risk aversion would play a role. As soon as 
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some inputs or outputs cannot be marketed at all, several risk aversion 
coefficients start to play a role. A farm family may be highly averse 
tq food-risk at some point, but not to 'leisure'-risk or less to cash-
risks. Measures for multivariate risk aversion have been developed by 
Kihlstrom & Mirman(1974), Hanoch(1977), Karni(1979) and others but no 
applications seem yet to have been made. 
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